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We will study the credit supply effects of the unexpected regulation in capital ratios (LTD ratio) 
imposed by the Troika under the Economic Adjustment Program for Portugal, using an 
exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data for SMEs. The introduction of LTDs ratios regulations may 
force banks to reduce their exposure to credit markets and in order to adequate its balance 
sheet, banks can reduce lending for firms causing funding problems to companies. In order to 
evaluate the impact of this regulation, we will have to construct a variable to measure the degree 
of exposure of firms’ to more or less affected banks. Therefore, we will have to control for several 
firm-level balance sheet variables and sales to account for market demand. 
Using data from Central Balance Sheet provided by Banco de Portugal, an extensive dataset 
containing balance sheet variables for a representative number of firms operating in Portugal, we 
conclude that in fact the LTD ratio policy had an impact in firms’ investment during the period of 
analysis. 





















1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 8 
2. Loan to deposit ratios in the context of the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis...................... 9 
3. Objectives .................................................................................................................. 12 
4. Literature Review ........................................................................................................ 14 
4.1 Loan-to-Deposit Ratios ..................................................................................................... 14 
4.2 Capital Ratios Regulations ............................................................................................ 15 
5. Data Sources and Summary Statistics .......................................................................... 17 
6. Variables, Methodology and Econometric Approach ....................................................... 20 
6.1 Variables ...................................................................................................................... 20 
6.2 Methodology and Empirical Model ................................................................................ 22 
7. Results ...................................................................................................................... 25 
7.1 Additional robustness checks ........................................................................................ 29 
8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 30 
9. Appendix A: ................................................................................................................ 31 



















TABLE 5 – VARIABLES DESCRIPTION ..................................................................................... 31 




FIGURE 1 – LTD RATIOS FOR PORTUGUESE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND EURO AREA ................ 10 
FIGURE 2 –LOAN-TO-DEPOSIT RATIOS OF PORTUGUESE BANKS ........................................... 13 
FIGURE 3 – LOANS TO NON-FINANCIAL SECTOR – BY FIRM SIZE .......................................... 14 
FIGURE 4 – LTD RATIOS FOR COLLECTED BANKS IN THE SAMPLE ....................................... 20 




TABLE 1 – CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS.................................................................................... 11 
TABLE 2 – SMES DEFINITION ................................................................................................ 18 
TABLE 3 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ..................................................................................... 19 
TABLE 4 – DEGREES OF EXPOSURE ...................................................................................... 21 
TABLE 5 – REGRESSION ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 26 









The aim of this thesis is to explore the indirect link between the unexpected shock on the banking 
sector, namely the regulation concerning the Loan to deposit (LTD) ratios required by the Troika under the 
Economic Adjustment Program for Portugal, and firms’ investment. In a nutshell, how shocks that have a 
relative impact in financial intermediaries can overflow to real effects, particularly in terms of companies’ 
investment capacity? 
The purpose of this research is relevant as Portugal had emerged from the world economic crisis in 
2008 and during the period the crisis of the European Union's sovereign debt was ongoing, some of the 
impositions by the regulatory authority could negatively influence the country's recovery. The structure at 
the business level in Portugal is mainly composed of micro, small and medium-sized firms, 0,3% of the total 
number of firms in Portugal are large and approximately 99,7% are micro-enterprises (according to 2015 
data). Any impact is important in economic terms as since SME's contributed to approximately 55% of total 
turnover and 75% of employment in Portugal. SME’s are very dependent on banks’ credit. Data from 
Acharya et al (2014) indicate that there was a 45% drop in new credits during 2008 to 2013. Therefore, 
changes in credit supply conditions might have a significant impact in the economy. 
We investigate the impact in the economy of regulatory changes on loan-to-deposit ratios by exploring a 
rich database (Central Balance Sheet) that contains general data of the firms (year of foundation, type of 
company, sector, etc.), economic-financial data that contains variables extracted from the balance sheets of 
the firms (assets, equity, liabilities, etc.) and employment data. This panel represents the universe of non-
financial companies operating in Portugal, consisting of a relatively large sample, indicating that the present 
study does not suffer from data underrepresentation problems. Based on this, given the unavailability of 
access to bank level data, data from LTD ratios were collected manually from 2010 to 2015 from 18 
Portuguese banking institutions, as well as from the 5 main banks in the country, representing 
approximately 80% of the credit made available during the period. Using that information, Banco de 
Portugal Microdata Research Laboratory (BPLim) constructed a variable indicating the level of exposure of 
firms (in terms of credit) to banks which were more or less affected by the policy of decreasing LTD ratios. 
In this way, we matched the CB database with the dataset created by BPLim with the aforementioned 
variable using an anonymized indicator of a firm. 
Given the banking relationship that a firm has, regardless of the number of banks, we built a credit-
weighted exposure variable that takes into account the LTD ratio in which bank 𝑏 was in year 𝑦 and thus 





As this level of exposure is a continuous variable, it makes economic sense to check it in levels, that is, 
given a certain level of exposure to more or less affected banks, what is the reflection on the investment 
capacity of a firm 𝑖? 
For this, we divide the exposure variable into deciles, and formulate the following hypothesis: 
Given a firm's greater exposure in terms of credit and potential credit to banks hard hit by the 
regulation of LTD ratios, it is expected that that firm will not be able to raise loans and consequently 
decrease its investment capacity. 
In order to verify this hypothesis, we estimate an econometric model with fixed effects for firm 
(partialling out any time invariant differences between firms) and fixed effects for years (taking into account 
aggregate effects that can influence the outcome, such as sovereign debt crisis of the euro zone and two 
capital exercises proposed by the EBA), we also use financial variables in order to control and finally, the 
created exposure variable to link the adjustment of the ratios and variation in the firms' investments. 
We present evidence to corroborate our main hypothesis: a higher level exposure of firms to banks 
affected by the policy is associated with a negative investment variation; we found that our main variable is 
significant in all exposure deciles, the magnitude of the investment variation for SMEs is decreasing and 
varies from -1.5 pp (second decile) to -5.7 pp (last decile), when we tested the robustness of our results, we 
found that the variation in investment for large companies (with revenues greater than 50 M Euros) has no 
relation to the level of exposure of these companies to more or less affected banks. 
This thesis is structured as follows. In section 2, describes the context of Portugal in the sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe and the role of Loan to deposit ratio regulation. In section 3, we present the main objectives 
of this thesis. In section 4, we discuss the literature about credit crunch events and liquidity. In section 5, 
we describe the construction of the dataset and present the descriptive statistics. In section 6, we describe 
the methodology used in this thesis. Section 7, present and discuss the results. Section 8, concludes.  
 
2. Loan to deposit ratios in the context of the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis 
 
 The after effects of the world financial crisis in 2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis that the 
world has witnessed are clearly related to the activity of regulators in order to set new capital requirements 
and try to enhance the structure and robustness of finance sector. Consequently, an active debate in 
academia about the trade-offs related to higher capital and liquidity has arisen.  
Specifically, on the European sovereign crisis and its effects in Portugal is a clear object of study, given 





Portuguese banks, as opposed to many other European banks, managed the first part of the crisis 
pretty well mainly because of their lack of exposure to toxic assets such as subprimes (European 
Commission, 2011). However, the Portuguese banking system had some major weaknesses that made it 
vulnerable later on in the crisis. First of all, it had a very weak liquidity position, being too dependent on 
wholesale and interbank borrowing with an average loan-to-deposit ratio of 160% until mid-2010 (European 
Commission, 2011), much higher than the European Union average as we can see in Figure 1. 
Furthermore, the proportion of real estate and mortgage loans, as a percentage of total credit outstanding, 
was high and Portuguese families were extremely indebted, making loans to that sector very vulnerable.   
 
 
         Note: Source Eurostat – RAI (Risk Assessment Indicators database). 
 
In 2010, total outstanding residential loans amounted to 66.2% of the Portuguese GDP (European 
Commission, 2011). The other major weakness lies in their increasing exposure to sovereign risk, 4.1% of 
the total assets in January 2011 (Banco de Portugal, 2011). Therefore, financial markets had poor 
expectations on the sustainability of public finances which led to a strong increase in risk premium on 
sovereign debt. This had negative repercussions on the Portuguese banking system’s access and funding 
costs in the international wholesale debt markets (Banco de Portugal 2010). In this context, Portuguese 
banks were, therefore, facing restrictions on access to interbank money market financing, which led to a 
worsening in their liquidity situation (Banco de Portugal, 2010).   
In April 2011, the Portuguese government, saw a significant decline in its credit rating to below 
investment grade, (Standard & Poor’s downgraded the country to BBB-), making it impossible for banks to 
fully rediscount Portuguese sovereign debt at the European Central Bank. In April the Portuguese 





government requested financial assistance from Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and 
IMF) and in May both parts finalized the negotiations and signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
launching the Economic Adjustment Program (European Commission,2011). The program covered the 
period from 2011 to 2014 consisted of a joint-financial package of up to 78 billion euros (provided by 
EFSM, EFSF and IMF) for potential fiscal financing needs and support to the banking system.   
 
2Table 1 – Chronology of Events 
Date Event 
dec/09 
EU council addresses recommendations to Portugal in 
accordance with Article 126(7) with a view to bringing an end to 
the situation of an excessive government deficit by 2013. 
nov/09 
Parliament passes austerity budget aimed at bringing down high 
public debt levels. The budgetary target for 2011 is set at 4.6 
percent of GDP. 
mar/11 
The Portuguese government addresses to EC and ECB a note in 
which it engages to undertake substantial fiscal and structural 
measures.                                                                                                                                                  
Stability Programme spelling out the measures included in the 
note sent to the Commission and ECB fails to be approved in 
Parliament.                                                                                                                                  
S&P downgrade Portugal's credit rating to BBB-. 
apr/11 
Portugal request financial assistance from EFSM/EFSF and IMF 
Technical mission of Troika starts discussions with Portuguese 
authorities. 
may/11 
The Programme is agreed at technical level between Troika 
mission and Portuguese authorities.                                             
Signature of the Memorandum of Understanding / The 
Programme is agreed by the IMF board.                                         
Council adopts implementing Decision of granting union financial 
assistance amounting to EUR 78 billion. 
Note: Adapted from Europe Commission (2011) 
 
One of the programme’s objectives was the stabilization of the financial sector (European Commission, 
2011). In order to achieve this goal, the banking sector was asked to work on the four following pillars 
(Banco de Portugal, 2012): reinforcing the solvency of the banking system, promoting a gradual an orderly 
deleveraging of the banking system and ensuring the stable funding of the banking system, reinforcing the 
supervision of the banking system and strengthening the regulatory framework.  
This research will focus specifically on topic 46 of the document presented by the technical commission 





guidelines to maintain the stability of financial sector while supporting a balanced and orderly deleveraging 
of banks (Europe Commission, 2011). The technical commission restate that the deleveraging of banks 
must be done “in an orderly fashion within the Eurosystem framework, be consistent with the Economic 
Adjustment Programme and follow clear, institution-specific target loan-to-deposit ratios” (Europe 
Commission, 2011). The Bank of Portugal acted as supervisory entity, conducting four-monthly reviews in 
conjunction with ECB, IMF and European Commission in order to evaluate the feasibility of individual banks' 




This paper focus on a specific capital requirement, the Loan-to-deposit ratio (LTD). According to 
Kashyap et al. (2002) deposit-taking and lending by banks are closely related, where both of variables 
reveal the liquidity transformation function of banks, thus it's important to deal with loans and deposits 
jointly, as is done with LTD ratio. The LTD ratio measures the coverage of loans with stable funds, usually 
deposits of households, non-financial firms and government. When loans exceed deposits, we face a 
funding problem in which banks move to wholesale funding, basically demanding the bank to continually 
roll over bill and bond issues and to renew borrowing from other financial institutions, in general depending 
on both domestic and foreign investors.  
As we can see in Figure 1, since 2009 the average LTD ratio for Portuguese banks was about 165, 
which means that for every 100 euros deposited, banks had 165 euros in loans. The Economic Adjustment 
Programme, approved in May/2011 with the total duration until 2014, and since then the LTD ratio 

















3Figure 2 –Loan-to-deposit ratios of Portuguese banks 
 
Note: Source Eurostat – RAI (Risk Assessment Indicators database) / the red marks indicate  
the begin and the final date of the Economic Adjustment Program. 
 
LTD's regulation has the role of a macroprudential policy instrument to contain systemic risk in periods 
of economic expansion and it is reasonable to link this type of regulation to a possible shortage of credit in 
the economy – see, for example, Kashyap et al. (2002).  
Said that, this project aims to verify if the regulation required by the Troika under the Economic 
Adjustment Program caused a shortage in credit for Portuguese SMEs, going further, we want to check how 
the banks manage their lending due to a negative liquidity shock, how does it affects the financial “health” 
of the companies, more specifically, its investment variation.  
Hence, one problem of identification in the research is to disentangle the fall in demand for credit by 
SMEs (exhibited in Figure 2), due to the crisis in the euro zone with the liquidity shock and to link its effects 






4Figure 3 – Loans to non-financial sector – by firm size 
 
Note: Source BPStat – Monetary and financial statistics - the red marks indicate  
the begin and the final date of the Economic Adjustment Program. 
 
 A contribution to the literature is the identification of a causal link between a negative liquidity shock 
(drop of LTD ratios) to a credit supply for SMEs firms in Portugal, using an extensive dataset linking bank 
balance sheets, loans, firm balance sheets provided by Banco de Portugal. We will be able to verify the 
impact of public policy and regulations regarding the financial sector and how this shock flows into the non-
financial sector thought loans to Portuguese SMEs during the Economic Adjustment Program. 
 
 
4. Literature Review 
 
4.1 Loan-to-Deposit Ratios 
 
According to Van den End (2016), deposit-taking and loaning by banks are closely related and the two 
concepts reflect the liquidity function of banks. The Loan-to-Deposit ratio is the main liquidity indicator that 
measures this relationship between loans and deposits. When loans exceeds deposits, banks’ face a 
funding problem and they have to access financial markets, which may be more expensive and unstable 
(Van den End, 2016). 
The macroprudential dimension identifies the link among funding imbalances at the bank level and 
system wide liquidity risk, in other words, if a considerable share of banks operates with a funding gap, 
negative shocks to market funding can stress the whole banking sector, affecting credit supply and 





LTD ratios and other variables, for example, Le Leslé (2012) as a measure of liquidity problems at the 
banking sector. 
As indicated by Goodhart et al. (2013) no single regulatory measure is enough to address the several 
sources of systemic risk. Their model in particular suggests that capital itself is insufficient to suppress the 
problems that arise during a crisis. This emphasize the importance of funding measures based on the LTD 
ratio to alleviate systemic liquidity risk, and reveals that the ratio could be used by the macroprudential 
authority to address long and short term liquidity risks. 
According to Kashyap et al.(2002) the ratio will fluctuate on a trend reflecting short-term financial 
cycles, it tends to rise in years of economic boom, given that there is market funding to finance the credit 
expansion, furthermore, the ratio usually levels of in turbulent economic circumstances when wholesale 
funding is replaced for retail savings and consequently credit growth decline. 
 
4.2 Capital Ratios Regulations 
 
The multiple potential adjustment dimensions and scarcity of historical episodes to evaluate the 
response of banks to a tightening of liquidity regulation has created a wide range of views about the impact 
of liquidity regulation.  
Bernanke and Lown (1991) analyse the impact of bank capital on lending during the recession in 1990-
1991 and find that a 1 percentage point increase in the capital to asset ratio had a positive impact of 2.6 
p.p in the growth rates of loans. On the other hand, a study carried out by Hancock and Wilcox (1993) 
analyses bank credit flows in 1990 and concludes that each US$1 that banks fell short of regulatory capital 
reduce bank credit by US$3, they also estimated the effect of a shortfall in bank capital relative to a specific 
target (the hypothesis was that banks have an internal target) and the results were for every US$1 
additional in capital reduce loan growth by US$1.5. Those papers used cross sectional or panel data 
analysis that uses regional variation in bank health and economic conditions to set a relationship between 
capital requirements and bank lending.  
Some papers followed a dynamic strategy (such as VAR) placing bank capital and economic variables. 
In this vein, Berrospide and Edge (2010) in an analysis for the US, uses Bank Holding Companies data, for 
the period 1992-2009, to verify the impact of banking capital on lending. Those authors find an impact of 
0.7 to 1.2 p.p in loan growth for a 1 percentage point increase in capital ratio and claim that their results 
are less concerning than the others because when banks lend to big holding companies they are more 





Other papers look into banks bailouts in specific countries, Gianetti and Simonov (2013) analyze the 
banking crisis in Japan and the efforts by the government to recapitalize banks and reach required capital 
ratios. They conclude that large capital infusions made by government increased credit supply and make 
allocation more effective.   
Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) looked into lending in Italy after Lehmann Brother’s crash, they find 
that facing capital constraints, banks direct loans to less riskier companies (flight to quality) and the 
incapacity of borrowers to change their lending channel (banks), from less capitalized to stronger banks.  
Khwaja and Mian (2008) develop a new methodology to overcome the identification problem of 
disentangling the dynamics of demand and credit supply from the effect of a specific policy or event and 
consequently the effects on real economy. The strategy is based on within firm differences-in-differences 
comparing loans from distinct banks to the same firm, thus firm fixed effects absorb the whole firm specific 
change in credit demand therefore the difference estimated in loan changes within the same firm can be 
seemingly attributed to differences in bank liquidity shocks. The authors used a natural experience, the 
nuclear tests made in Pakistan in 1998 that forced banks to block dollars withdrawals in order to secure 
the government against problems in balance of payments and concluded that a 1% decline in bank liquidity 
leads to 0,6% decline in bank’s loan to a specific firm. The authors also looked into its differences in firm’s 
size, the coefficients for 1% drop in a bank’s liquidity leads to a reduction in lending for small firms of 0,87% 
and of 0,3% for large firms.  
 Gropp et al. (2019), following Khwaja and Mian (2008), focus their analysis on a specific event: the 
increase in capital requirements for selected banks in the Euro area by the European Banking Authority in 
2011. The authors build a panel linking syndicated loans, banks and non-financial firms’ balance sheets 
and perform their analysis for bank-level, loan-level and firm-level, exploiting the existence of multiple bank-
firm relationships. Gropp et al. (2019) cluster industries in order to isolate specific effects, finding that 
banks affected by the event reduce their credit supply of syndicated loans by 27 percentage points 
compared to banks in the control group and for firm-level. They also conclude that firms that obtain credit 
from affected banks exhibited 4 percentage points less asset growth, 5 percentage point less sales and 6 
percentage points less investment growth. 
Finally, Iyer et al. (2014), using the same approach as Khwaja and Mian (2008), using firm multiple 
banking relationships in order to control for demand effects, analysed the specific case that occurred in 
Portugal during the crisis in 2007, the unexpected freeze on European interbank market, causing a negative 
liquidity shock due to lack of funding for banks. The authors used a differences-in-differences approach 





interbank borrowing ratios, they found that the dependence of interbank funds reduces credit supply for 
firms and a 10% increase in interbank borrowing of the lending bank results in a 3,7% reduction in credit 
availability for firms, they also found that the credit supply reduction is higher for smaller and younger 
Portuguese firms. 
 
5. Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
 
We analyze the impact of the regulation imposed by Troika under the Economic Adjustment Program, 
during 2010 to 2015. In order to verify the causal link between the liquidity shock and credit market, we 
have to overcome the identification problem that is the effects of economic crisis in Europe and 
consequently in Portugal during the period, the crisis may cause a reduction in loans, so is difficult to see 
the specific effects of the adjustment program (drop in LTD ratios) itself. 
We have access to the records on all granted loans, which are recorded by the Bank of Portugal, which 
is the regulator and supervisor of the banking system in Portugal. For these purposes, we employ the 
information in the credit register (Central Credit Register, CRC in Portuguese) which contains confidential 
and very detailed information at the loan level on all commercial and industrial (C&I) loans granted to all 
non-financial publicly limited and limited liability companies by all banks operating in Portugal in order to 
calculate the degree of exposure of firms to more or less affected banks and the Central Balance Sheet 
Harmonized Panel Data (CBHP) that provides economic and financial information on Portuguese non-
financial companies. 
According to the CBHP manual, the dataset is constructed based on Central Balance database  which 
contains economic and financial data for companies in Portugal annually since 2006 onwards, and is based 
on information reported through “Informação Empresarial Simplificada” (IES), the harmonized panel which 
we will use for this research, contains only variables that are consistent over time because they were not 
affected since the changing of accounting systems (in 2010, the replacement of POC to SNC). 
Some delimitations were defined for the scope of the this research, for example, we exclude from the 
CB database, all large companies (with revenues greater than 50 mm Euros per year, and employs more 
than 250 people), so we will follow the European Commission Recommendation 2003/361/CE and 
selected only SMEs firms, by definition: SMEs are defined taking into account the number of permanent 
employees, turnover and / or total annual balance sheet. Thus, a micro enterprise is one that "employs 
less than 10 people and whose annual turnover or annual balance sheet does not exceed 2 million euros"; 
as a small company one that “employs less than 50 people and whose annual turnover or annual balance 





people and whose annual turnover does not exceed 50 million euros or whose total annual balance does 
not exceed 43 million euros ”, as we can see in Table 1 above,  
     
1  Table 2 – SMEs Definition 
  Micro Small Medium 
Nº of workers <10 <50 <250 
Turnover ≤2M€ ≤10M€ ≤50M€ 
Annual Balance Sheet ≤2M€ ≤10M€ ≤43M€ 
          Notes: Turnover and Annual Balance Sheet are measured in Million Euros. 
 
 We choose to not include Large firms, due to the facility of these companies to seek liquidity through 
other mechanisms in the financial market, such as, issuance of debt securities, IPO's and public traded 
companies, which are able to raise capital to finance their operations through the sale of shares, both types 
of companies do not need exclusively credit offered by banks to raise capital, thus they could bias the 
obtained results. Moreover, according to CB database, in 2015 SMEs accounts for approximately, 99,7% 1of 
all non-financial firms in Portugal, (89,1% were Micro companies and 10,6% were Small & Medium firms), 
and in terms of total turnover, SMEs accounts for 58,5% of total turnover (specifically, Micro companies : 
15,8% and Small & Medium firms : 42,7%).  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression model. Our dataset 
consists of more than two million observations; the average firm in our sample is thirteen years old with a 
median of ten years. The mean leverage ratio is 35% with a median of 5%, our average firm is well 










                                                          





2 Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median SD 
Firm Age 13.45 10.00 12.20 
ln (Total Assets) 11.44 11.50 2.09 
Leverage 0.35 0.05 0.86 
ln (Tangibility) 0.22 0.08 0.28 
ln (Networth) 10.78 10.80 2.01 
ln (Sales) 11.23 11.46 2.34 
Export (% of exporting firms) 11%     
Notes: Variables are measure in Euros, Firm Age is measured in Years 
Number of observations: 2.433.912  
 
In order to check whether a Bank was affected or not by the policy (adjustment program), it is 
necessary to collect data of their LTD ratios, for reasons of confidentiality and unavailability, it was 
necessary to carry out a manual collection of LTD ratios in the documents “Balance Sheets & Reports” of 
banks operating in Portugal through their respective websites. The expression used by banks to calculate 
LTD ratios is the same as per BdP instruction 23/2011, in order to have comparable data between banks, 
eliminating any concerns regarding the calculation of the ratio that could generate discrepant results in the 
analysis. 
Thus, according to expression below, the ratios are calculated using the following variables: 
 
                                  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡−(
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡
)
𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡
                                                                                   
So, we have the following set up: 18 financial institutions2  that represents about 80% of all credit 
granted in Portugal (according to the BPLim), with different levels of adjustment of LTD ratios, it was not 
possible to find all ratios for all banks due to the fact that some institutions did not provide the indicator in 
their balance sheets, as well as the above accounts to calculate the indicator. 
Therefore, in the pre-adjustment period (2010) we have an average ratio of 140, and in subsequent 
years, until 2014 (deadline for banks to adjust their ratios), there was a negative adjustment of 25 




                                                          
2
 The financial institutions are: BPI SA, Santander Totta SA, Banco Comercial Português SA, Caixa Geral de Depósitos SA, Haitong Bank SA (former Espirito 
Santo Investment Bank), Finantia SA, Banco de Investimento Global SA, Bison Bank (Former BANIF Banco de Investment), Banco Português de Gestão SA, BEST 
SA, Caixa Económica Montepio Geral SA, Banco BIC Português SA, Novo Banco dos Açores SA, Banco Atlântico Europa SA, Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola 
Mútuo CRL, BANIF SA. For analysis purposes, Banco Espírito Santo was considered too, liquidated in 2013 and transformed into NOVO Banco SA, thus, the 





5Figure 4 – LTD Ratios for Collected Banks in the sample 
 
Notes: Own computations. Based on the manual collection on “Balance Sheets & Reports” of 18 banks operating in Portugal (red curve), the blue curve 
have the Loan-to-Deposit ratios of the fifth largest banks in Portugal, according to BdP : Caixa Geral de Depósitos, BPI, Santander Totta, BCP, Banco 
Espirito Santo (until the bankruptcy in 2013) and Novo Banco ( for 2014 and 2015 values).  
 
 
6. Variables, Methodology and Econometric Approach 
 
6.1 Variables 
From the collection of LTD ratios of the 18 financial institutions mentioned above, the BPLim (Microdata 
Laboratory of Banco de Portugal) team identified from each firm's unique randomized code (TINA), the 
available credit3 by the financial institution 𝑏  to firm 𝑖  in year 𝑡, in order to build an index that measures 
the exposure degree of firms (through loans) to banks with their respective levels of LTD ratios. 
Denotes in the expression (2) 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , exposure degree of firm 𝑖 in a year 𝑡 (December values), 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡, amount of credit (in Euros), available for firm 𝑖 by bank 𝑏, at year 𝑡, divided by 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡, 
which corresponds to the total volume of credit made available to firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, multiplied by 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 −
𝑡𝑜 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑏,𝑡 , which corresponds to Bank LTDs ratio 𝑏 in the year 𝑡. 
 




𝑏=1 𝑥 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑏,𝑡                          (1) 
 
We have the following situation of the Degrees of exposure of firms during the analysis period, 
according to Table 3: 
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Table 4 – Degrees of Exposure 
Degrees of Exposure Min Max 
1 0 52.63 
2 52.63 73.06 
3 73.06 85.00 
4 85.00 97.85 
5 97.85 107.69 
6 107.69 113.00 
7 113.00 118.99 
8 118.99 127.10 
9 127.1 144.00 
10 144.00 379.00 
  Notes: Own computations.The degrees of exposure  
  are the deciles of the variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
 
As the above variable captures the degree of exposure of firms to banks (more or less affected by the 
policy of increasing LTD ratios) it is not coherent to analyze it as a set, as we would not be able to capture 
the different levels of exposure and how they influence investment. Thus, it is interesting to check the 
variable as an exposure decision, in order to group firms by their levels of exposure and check whether, 
given a higher or lower level, what effect this has on the investment of the firms.  
It is expected that given the exposure levels of the firms, the reflection of the decrease in investment will 
be increasing, that is, firms that make up the last deciles, will be more affected in the investment variation 
than firms that make up the first deciles. 
We also include some control variables (see table 2 for a detailed description of the variables). 
Tangibility is used as a proxy for collateral, since it corresponds to a firm's capital structure. The theory 
suggests that companies with more tangible assets in their capital structure are more likely to raise credit, 
given that these types of assets are easily valued by the market and can be used as collateral (Campello 
and Giambona, 2013). 
We will use a firm's financial leverage as a risk measure, given the level of leverage a bank may be 
more apt or not to give credit to that company, so we will use leverage as a risk measure, the variable was 
calculated using Debt scaled by Equity and Liabilities. 
Networth is a variable to gauge a company's health and it provides a snapshot of the firms’ current 
financial position, since lenders (banks) scrutinize a business's net worth to determine if it is financially 





repay its loans and can affect their investments as well, thus, we take the logarithm of Total Assets minus 
Total Liabilities to calculate Networth. 
We will use a the logarithm of firm’s total assets to control for the size of the firms, according to Gropp 
et al (2019) and firm's age as a measure of a lender's perception of risk and bank relationship, as long as 
long-term relationship with banks can facilitate access to credit for older firms. 
We will use the logarithm of Sales in order to control for demand effects and dummy variable for 
exporting firms. 
All control variables were winsorized before the log transformation at the 1% level following Gropp et al 
(2019). 
We are interested to verify the indirect link between firms’ exposure (in terms of global credit) to banks 
that had to adequate its levels of LTD ratios and how this exposure affects firms’ investments. So, we have 
constructed a variable to proxy investment using the variation of fixed tangible assets, denoted in expression 
(2). 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 =
(𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1)+𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
                 (2) 
 
6.2  Methodology and Empirical Model 
 In order to achieve the relationship that we are seeking, this research will follow Gropp et al. (2019) 
and will use a Fixed Effects model for panel data, since it is the most used method in corporate finance. 
A regression model with panel data, with 𝑛 observations in 𝑇 periods and 𝐾 variables, can be 
represented as follows: 
                                      𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,   𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛; 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇                                     (3)   
Where 𝑦
𝑖𝑡
 is the dependent variable, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a 1 𝐾 vector containing the explanatory variables, 𝛽 is a 
vector of parameters to be estimated and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 it the errors. The sub-indices 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote the observational 
unit and the period of each variable, respectively. Thus, in a database with balanced panel data, the total 
number of observations corresponds to 𝑛 ⋅ 𝑇. 
If the model follows all the classical regression hypotheses, one can estimate it by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), obtaining the desired estimates. The main ones refer to the error, which is assumed to be 
homoscedastic and not correlated in time and space. 
The problem of heteroscedasticity, if detected, makes it necessary to use the method of Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS). According to Verbeek (2008), if the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator were 





and consistent, but would not be more efficient. Thus, the significance tests of the estimates would be 
biased if OLS was used. The same argument is valid in the presence of autocorrelation of errors. 
Another problem that may arise in panel data, and that would make the use of OLS impossible, is 
endogeneity. This occurs when the correlation between some explanatory variable 𝑥𝑗 and the error is 
different from zero, that is: 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑗, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0. 
Wooldridge (2016) highlights the three main sources of endogeneity: omission of model variables 
(unobserved heterogeneity), measurement errors of the variables and simultaneity between the variables. 
The most frequent problem with panel data is the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. In this case, there 
would be factors that determine the dependent variable but are not being considered in the equation within 
the set of explanatory variables because they are not directly observable or measurable. Taking into account 
the unobserved heterogeneity, the model above can be rewritten as follows: 
                                 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,   𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛; 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇                          (4) 
Where 𝑐𝑖 represents the unobserved heterogeneity in each observational unit constant over time. 
According to Wooldridge (2016), if 𝑐𝑖  is correlated with any variable in 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and we try to apply OLS in 
this case, the estimates will be not only biased but also inconsistent. 
The same consequences occur in the model in the case where the classical hypothesis that there is no 
correlation between some explanatory variable 𝑥𝑗 and the error 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑗, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0 is not valid. Thus, in this 
case, we can only use OLS if we have justification to assume that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑐𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = 0. If that hypothesis is 
valid we can consider a new compound term, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ≡  𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and estimate the model by OLS, since we 
would have 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑉𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥𝑗) = 0. 
In the case where 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑐𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) = 0 in order to estimate this equation consistently, the most usual 
approach in the context of longitudinal data is Fixed Effects. In this estimation method, even allowing 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑐𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = 0 the idea is to eliminate the unobserved effect 𝑐𝑖, based on the following assumption 
𝐸(𝜀|𝑥𝑖, 𝑐𝑖) = 0, where 𝑥𝑖 ≡ (𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2, … 𝑥𝑖𝑇) known as a strict exogeneity condition. The transformation of 
fixed effects (or transformation within) is achieved in two steps. Taking the mean of equation (4) in time we 
obtain:   
                                                     𝑦
𝑖
=  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                               (5) 
and subtracting (5) from (4) for each 𝑡, we get the transformed equation of fixed effects, 
                                                yit − yi = (xit − xi)β + εit − εi                                             (4)    
or          





thus removing the unobserved heterogeneity ci. 
The Fixed Effects estimator is obtained by applying OLS in equation (6) and under the assumption of 
strict exogeneity, this estimator is consistent. This estimator is also known as an estimator within, by using 
the time variation within each observational unit. 
In our model we include firm fixed effects to capture unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity and 
year fixed effects, to capture any time related effects that are not included in the model, for example, the 
two regulatory interventions introduced by EBA in 2011, the EBA stress test requiring 5% of core tier 1 ratio 
in June, in this specific event, any Portuguese bank was affected and the 2011 EBA capital exercise 
subsequently raised the required core tier 1 ratio to 9%, affecting some Portuguese banks4 . The estimated 
115 billion euro capital shortfall due to the EBA capital exercise was however well above the 2.5 billion euro 
capital shortfall due to the 2011 EBA stress test (Acharya, Engle, and DianePierret, 2014). 
Hence, in our empirical analysis, we control for a rich set of firm characteristics to remove any 
potential confounding factors and avoid an omitted-variable bias and capture other determinants of the 
firms’, corporate policies, loan demand and supply. These controls are, leverage, net worth, sales, age of 
the firm, total assets and tangibility.  
Finally we clustered standard errors at firm level, accounting for heteroskedasticity across firms in our 
model’s unexplained variation, or since the amount of variation in the outcome (investments) is correlated 
with the explanatory variables, so we can take this correlation into account. 
Said that, we have the following expression: 
               Δ𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽 ⋅ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾 ⋅ 𝑋 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (7) 
Where, Δ𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡, our main outcome is the percentage variation in a firms’ 𝑖 investments 
(proxied by the capital expenditures of the firm) in a year 𝑡. The variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 measure the level of 
exposure of a firm 𝑖 to bank 𝑏, in terms of global credit (sum of regular credit and potential credit, 
representing the total available credit that a firm can access), since it’s not a categorical variable but 
continuous (varies from 0 to 379), we split 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 in deciles to verify the relationship between a firm 
level of exposure to a more or less affected bank by the Adjustment in LTD ratios and a firms’ capacity to 
invest, we expect that, lower levels of 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖,𝑡, reflects in a higher variation of investment, since those 
firms’ were indirectly less affected by the policy. 
In vector 𝑋 we control for several firm-specific characteristics and market demand. We first introduce 
age of the firm (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒), Total assets (ln 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) to control for size. In addition, we include a set 
                                                          
4 Four Portuguese banks were affected during EBA Capital Exercise in 2011 : Banco BPI SA, Banco Comercial Português SA, Caixa Geral de Depósitos and 





of balance sheet variables to capture a firms’ financial situation,𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, as a perception of risk, 
Tangibility (ln 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ) as a proxy for collateral and net worth (ln 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ) as a financial health 
indicator. Finally we include the logarithmized variation of Sales (ln 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) to control market demand. 
Besides that, Following Gropp et al (2019), 𝜂𝑡 is a set of Year fixed effects and 𝑛𝑖 is firm fixed effects to 




In this section, we examine how the degree of exposure to more or less affected bank can influence a 
firms’ investment, we first estimate the equation (7) for SME’s companies, since our hypothesis is: Smaller 
firms that rely only in banks credit and doesn’t have access to more sophisticated financial instruments or 
markets were affected, since the banks had to adjust their levels of LTD ratios following the Troika 
recommendation during 2011 to 2014 causing a credit shortfall. We find that there was a substantial 
reduction on banks’ LTD ratio of 25 percentage points and the results of our analysis shows that the impact 
of this policy was transmitted to SMEs companies.  
We estimate three specifications based in our baseline model of firms’ variation in investments as in 
Equation (7). Table 4 shows the specifications estimated, in column (3), the most strong specification, we 
control for firm characteristics and balance sheet variables (total assets, age of the firm, leverage, net 
worth, exporting firm, tangibility) and for market demand (sales) following Gropp et al (2019), we stress our 







4Table 5 – Regression Analysis 
Main Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Exposure (by deciles) 
   
 
 
[52.63 , 73.06] 
 
-0.027*** -0.023*** -0.015*** 
 
(73.06 , 85.00] -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.022*** 
 
(85.00 , 97.85] -0.038*** -0.043*** -0.030*** 
 
(97.85 , 107.69] -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.030*** 
 
(107.69 , 113.00] -0.029*** -0.042*** -0.035*** 
 
(113.00 , 118.99] -0.033*** -0.042*** -0.031*** 
 
(118.99 , 127.01] -0.016*** -0.040*** -0.037*** 
 
(127.01 , 144.00] -0.022*** -0.040*** -0.037*** 
  (144.00 , 379.00] -0.008*** -0.051*** -0.057*** 


















0.041*** -0.000  
ln (Sales)     0.037*** 0.021*** 
Firm FE 
 
NO NO YES 
Year FE 
 
NO YES YES 
r2 
 
0.001 0.063 0.046 
N 
 
803.380 345.304 345.304 
F-test for H0 : 2nd decile = 10th decile (p-value) 
 
0.014 
Joint test of significance (p-value)     0.000 
Notes: Own computations. The dependent variable is investments in Euros. The sample use data from 2010 to 2015 (the whole period of the LTDs ratios 
Policy) for SME’s.Our main variable of interest (exposure) is in deciles in order to measure how this  intensity influence firms’ outcomes. In column 1 we 
don’t control for any balance sheet variables nor Year and Firm FE, in column 2 we include firm controls and Year FE, in column 3 we add firm controls, 
Year and Firm FE. We perform two tests, one to check if the coefficients of the 2nd and 10th decile are equal and a joint test, to verify if all year dummies are 
equal to zero. Standard errors are adjusted for heterokesdacity and clustered at firm level. Significance levels *10%, **5%, ***1%.  
 
As expected when we split our main variable of interest (Exposure) in deciles we clearly verify that the 
affected-bank effect is present at all deciles and its relationship with firms’ investment variation are 
significant at one percent statistical significance level. The magnitude of investment variation for SMEs is 







6Figure 5: Investment variation by deciles of Exposure 
 
 
Notes: Own computations. Created using the coefficients in column (3) of Table 4; The values in parenthesis represent the  95% conf. interval for each 
deciile. 
 
So, firms that had a commercial relationship (in terms of credit exposure) with less affected banks (or 
banks that had a lower LTD’s ratios) faced a variation in their investments of -1.5 pp comparing to firms 
that had a relationship with more affected banks, faced a variation in their investments of -5.7 pp (tenth 
decile), supporting our main hypothesis: the level of exposure to more affected banks influence the firms’ 
investment, since they face a reduction in credit because of the exogenous shock to the bank supply. Put 
differently, firms borrowing from banks exposed to LTD ratios reduction policy are more likely to reduce its 
investments. 
These results above are coherent to the literature of credit crunch events and its effects on financial 
outcomes of firms, for example, in Cingano et al. (2016), using Italian credit register data, observed the 
2007 liquidity drought in interbank markets as a consequence of variation in credit supply by banks and 
consequently affects firms’ investment, they found strong effects for young and small firms, they provided 
evidence that firms that borrowed from banks with a higher level of exposure to the interbank market faced 
a higher negative variation in investments, given a 10% increase of exposure induces a fall of approximately 
10% in the investment rate of a firm. In another paper, Bottero et al. (2020) looking for banks that were 








≤73.06 ≤85.00 ≤97.85 ≤107.69 ≤113.00 ≤118.99 ≤127.01 ≤144.00 ≤379.00 






credit) cut investments more than less exposed firms, for a percentage point increase in lender’s exposure, 
firms reduce its investments by 0,3 percent, they have also find that the results are driven by small firms. 
Next, we focus on the firm-specific control variables. The coefficients of Total assets, leverage and 
tangibility are all significant at one percent statistical significant level and precise. Larger firms (in terms of 
assets) are less likely to reduce investment, consistent with Bentolila et al (2018) and Gropp et al (2019). 
We also document that firm tangibility or its capacity to use collateral to secure credit is relevant for its 
investments, a 10% variation in a firms’ tangibility leads to a 0.07 pp variation in investments, and that 
leverage is negatively associated with firms’ investment, suggesting that firms with higher levels of debt 
(riskier firms) face negative investment variations. We have also find that larger firms (in terms of assets) 
tends to have a higher variation in investments, specifically, a 10% variation in total assets is associated  
with a 0.01 pp increase of investments. Our results are in line with others that verify the impact of balance 
sheet position in corporate outcomes, for example, in Gropp et al (2019) and Dwenger et al (2020). 
Another significant finding of our analysis is the coefficients’ differences between column (2) and (3). In 
specification (3), we have the more robust model that we included firm and year fixed effects, in 
specification (2) we did not control for firm fixed effects, as we can observe in Table 4. The deciles of 
Exposure are higher in (2) than (3) and does not vary, we cannot observe any trend as we change to a 
higher degree of exposure.  
The coefficient signs of our control variables are not coherent to the literature as well, according to (2), 
a larger firm (in terms of total assets) face a decreasing of investment, a firm with more collateral capacity 
leads to a decrease of investments and the dummy exports variable is also significant at one percentage 
level of significance in column (2) and not in column (3).  
We can only explain this variation with firm fixed effects that we included in specification (3), 
apparently, it seems that there are a relevant number of unobservable time-invariant factors of the firms, 
that are important and influence the results in model (3). 
To show the robustness of our results, we run the equation using less restrictive specifications. In Table 
3, column (2) we exclude firm fixed effects and the coefficients for all deciles of the variable Exposure are 
statistical significant at one percent significance level, the magnitude is crescent in every decile and higher 
than the model in column (3), for example, it ranges from -2.3 pp (second decile) to -5.1 pp (last decile). 
In column (1) we exclude all firm controls, year and firm fixed effects from the original model described 
in Equation (7), all our coefficients remain significant at one percent significance level, but the magnitude 





We perform one test to verify if the coefficient values of the second and the tenth decile are equal and 
we reject this hypothesis and we can conclude that the coefficient of the 10th decile is lower than the 2nd 
decile and is statistically different. A joint test of significance as well and we can justify that the use of Fixed 
effects is adequate in our model.  
Finally, as demonstrated above, results remain different and statistical significance regarding 
specifications (3) and (2). Thus, the magnitude of the effects is significant  across all specifications but the 
magnitude is different. 
 
7.1  Additional robustness checks 
In this section we will provide additional robustness checks in order to verify if our results are robust 
and hold for different specifications. For this, we estimate the equation (7) excluding the SMEs companies 
from the sample and restricting the sample for large firms (with revenues greater than 50 million EUR).  
As expected it’s reasonable to argue that larger firms have access to other financial instruments or 
sources of credit  and don’t rely exclusively in commercial banks to have access to credit, they can shift 
more easily from a financier to another and again we confirm our expectations that, there’s no statistical 
significance of level of Exposure for large firms and its investment, none of the deciles has significance, 
even controlling for firms’ balance sheet characteristics, year and firm fixed effects,  as we can see in Table 
5 below: 
5Table 6 – Regression Analysis for Large Firms 




[53.95 , 75.79] -0.011 
 
(75.79 , 87.07]  0.001 
 
(87.07 , 96.63] 0.019 
 
(96.63 , 104.70] 0.005 
 
(104.70 , 111.67] 0.006 
 
(111.67 , 117.83] 0.025 
 
(117.83 , 126.39] -0.002 
 
(126.39 , 141.00] 0.006 
 
(141.00 , 265.86] 0.033 










N   3.219 
 
Notes: Own computations. The dependent variable is investments. The sample use data from 2010 to 2015 (the whole period of the LTDs ratios Policy) for Large 
companies.Our main variable of interest (exposure) is in deciles in order to  measure how this intensity influence firms’ outcomes. We stress our model with firm 








In this thesis, our main objective was to evaluate the impact of the LTDs regulation policy imposed by 
the Troika within the scope of Economic Adjustment Program for Portugal and to establish a relationship 
between this liquidity shock and the firms’ investment capacity. We achieve identification by accounting for 
the level of exposure of firms to more or less affected banks (who supplies credit for firms’). We proceed by 
breaking this exposure variable in deciles and comparing the magnitude effect of less and more affected 
firms. 
Having access to a very complete database, with detailed information about all non-financial firms 
operating in Portugal, allowed us to control for firm characteristics that are traditionally used in corporate 
finance analysis. 
We have find statistical significance in the degree of exposure to firms (SMEs) attached to the less and 
more affected bank, the magnitude of the effects in investment is also crescent, in other words, given the 
first deciles of exposure, the variation in investment is lower (but negative) than in the above deciles, in our 
preferred specification, it varies from -1.5 pp (second decile) to -5.7 pp (tenth decile).  
We have also estimated a robustness check to verify the same effect for large firms, and as expected 
we didn’t find any statistical relationship, arguing that for large firms, they could swap regular loans from 
commercial banks to other financial solutions and/or rely more in internal finance simply because they’re 
larger or have access to external financial market or in a case of a multinational company, intracompany 
loaning (from parent company to subsidiaries). 
Our results in this thesis have important policy implications. The regulators should take into 
consideration the composition of firm-bank relationship when imposing a regulation, the process of fast 
deleverage of large banks (in terms of LTD ratios) are correlated with a negative impact on firms 
investments, the reduction of banking concentration should be at policy maker agenda, with more options, 













9. Appendix A: 
 
 









𝑏=1 𝑥 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑏,𝑡     
Control Variables (Winsorized at 1% level) 










ln (𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ) ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) − ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) 
 
ln (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) ln(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡) − ln(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1) 
 
ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 − 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 1 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 Export=1 ; Dont’t export =0  
Explanatory Variable 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
(𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 − 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1) + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
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